Imagine yourself in Clara Immerwher’s position, reacting in horror to her husband’s use of poison gas. Imagine yourself haunted by vague but alarming intimations of the disaster your husband is bringing on himself, his country, and his civilization. Clara was fighting for the life of her child and her family. Yet she was accused of hysteria and treason. Small wonder she shot herself! We want to imagine a different Clara, one with a will to live—and even the stubbornness to insist on being taken seriously.
What could one say in such a position? The difficulty is, even if we imagine that Clara had intimations of the coming disaster, they would have been vague and ill-formed. The leading chemists of the day, those intimately involved with the then-cutting edge of technology, had some shared intimations of the shape of the world they were building. They spoke of their fears in the passive voice: “technology will make war impossible.” Perhaps this passive voice construction was self-protective: in a bellicose era pacifism was considered akin to treason. So they shifted the blame: “technology wants…” In any case, their statement of technology’s “desires” only existed as a collage of ill-formed hallucinations. It was not a fully-fleshed vision.
Strange as it may sound, it isn’t wrong to suggest that technology has political desires. With the benefit of hindsight, experts assert blithely that the standard shape of a “mature industrial society” is dramatically different from that of a pre-industrial society. So the passive-voice constructions of dissenters like Clara had meaning. One might reasonably claim that the newly abundant ammonia “wanted” its own mature political order.
A Mature Technological Order
That observation has lessons for our own era. If digital technology is truly “everything-changing,” that would imply there will be a standard shape of a “mature digital society.” It would be as different from that of a pre-digital one as an industrially developed economy is from a pre-industrial one. In the early days of this transition, it would seem that the new technology “wanted” the society to reform itself into the mature shape with which it was most comfortable. And dissenters like Clara, those who ramble confusingly about technology’s “desires”, would be harbingers and prophets of that new era. Not perhaps very clear prophets. But when is prophecy ever clear?
A New Conservatism…
The mature shape of a technological era has a curious property. Consider the new political order that finally fully took root in Germany. When the aftershocks wrought by the new technology finished playing out, eventually the country found a new stable order. The first democratically elected chancellor after World War II was Konrad Adenauer. We don’t think of Adenauer’s politics, described now as “center-right,” as notably radical. Not only that, we don’t even call him liberal! We think of Adenauer as a conservative.
Yet it is strange to call him conservative, because he wasn’t particularly conserving anything. Germany had just gone through its “Stunde Null,” or Zero Hour. Everything had been destroyed. Adenauer’s politics was not devoted to conserving the social order that had gone before. His pacifism, internationalism, commitment to full democracy, and pro-business attitude would all have been considered deeply radical under the rule of the Kaiser—only forty years earlier. Yet we still call him a conservative.
There was a massive paroxysm in those forty years. It transformed the Kaiser’s conservatism to Adenauer’s conservatism. We don’t blame these transformations on Adenauer’s personal desire for change. We call him a conservative because he conserved as much as could be conserved under the circumstances.
So even though those forty years changed everything, Adenauer is not considered the agent of change. Instead, he’s the agent of conservation.
So what was the actual agent of change? What “wanted” that massive transformation? Not the liberals, surely. They articulated no such desire. Not the old guard, certainly. They were politically destroyed. No faction of Germany’s old politics wanted the change that came to pass.
At the risk of excessive anthropomorphization, we might say: the newly abundant ammonia itself sought its own mature social order.
Conserves What…
There is a sense that Adenauer’s conservatism, non-conserving as it was, was more properly “normal” conservatism than Haber’s philosophy. The latter was much more obviously seeking to conserve, in the sense of preserving the pre-existing social order. However, as a social contract, it was increasingly unbalanced. It used technological change as an excuse to allow the ruling class to claim “heads I win, tails you lose”. The unquestioning loyalty of the young men who sacrificed their lives was demanded by this “conservatism”. But the corresponding traditions of chivalry and restraint of the aristocratic classes was allowed to lapse.
Eventually society recoiled against such a contract. The leaders associated with it were discredited and dismissed.
Adenauer’s conservatism, by contrast, was balanced. By default, he was pro-business in the manner of most center-right politicians. But he didn’t neglect the counterbalancing support for the rights of workers to demand fair wages and a safety net. He demanded military service, but also secured international cooperation. In a war-weary country, he ensured that conscripts’ lives would not be thrown away.
In other areas his policies were similarly cautious and balanced. All this meant he created a stable, lasting social order. For that reason we call him a conservative. It isn’t because he conserved what came before. It is because the social order he created could be conserved.
Can Be Conserved.
There is another way to understand the essential conservatism of his politics, radically new as it was. Suppose we have the kind of goals that have always characterized conservatism: promotion of national glory, a belief in the creative potential of competition, a desire to defend the outsize rewards that accompany outsize contributions to society, and a conviction that the welfare of the masses is best served by growth in the prosperity of the society as a whole. Suppose, now, that new technology changes the policies which will direct the society towards this desired destination.
This is what happened to Germany. The Kaiser still believed national glory could be achieved through military victory. By Adenauer’s era, that belief was dead. The arbitrarily abundant ammonia had changed everything. One of the things it had changed was what it meant to achieve a classically conservative goal.
The relation between ends and means can change. Then what will a true conservative choose? Does he choose as he always has chosen? Does he hew to the principle that conservatives respect tradition? Or does he pursue the same goal, if by a different path? Would he accept the principle that the goal rather than the methods constitute the core conserved conviction?
Liberalism Changes Less
Notice that the basic convictions of liberals alter less with changing times. Liberals tend to decry poverty, promote workers’ rights, and demand greater tolerance and rights for traditionally maligned groups. Their hearts bleed for suffering. They want politics to end that suffering in the most simple and direct way possible. Conservatives deride such impulses as naïve, the fantasies of inexperienced youth.
Such naïveté—if that is what it is—is at least robust in the face of change. As Jesus said, “the poor will always be with us.” Bleeding hearts can safely bleed as they have always bled. The essence of their philosophy is not fundamentally challenged by technological change.
One could envision politics as a wheel on which the youthful bleeding hearts exert a constant pull for change. Old and hoary conservatives resist the turn of the wheel. They believe that the naïve and ill-considered enthusiasms of the young must be held at bay.
But very occasionally, technology steps into this picture and “changes everything.” What does its change consist of? One might picture the wheel instead as a ratchet. The ratchet teeth represent the natural points on which conservatives can catch and hang on to resist the overenthusiastic pull of callow youth.
What technology does is kick conservatism off its tooth. It demands that the wheel spin free so that the hook can catch again on the next tooth.
Uniquely Dangerous Moment
This demand generates a uniquely dangerous political moment. To see why, let us return our focus to the fatal disagreement between Fritz and Clara. The way Haber told it, he was defending conservative wisdom. Clara was pushing a position so dangerously liberal it was beyond the pale. He was holding the wheel steady; she was pulling on it recklessly.
He was mischaracterizing the situation, however. The conflict was quite different from a normal dispute between a liberal and a conservative. In the normal situation, the conservative holds the wheel and the liberal pulls on it. One or the other might prevail. However, regardless of the outcome, the wheel is firmly in someone’s grasp. If one party loses their grip, the other is more than happy take hold. No matter what, someone is in charge.
In the conflict between Fritz and Clara, though, there was no such assurance. Fritz might have believed he was defending a conservative social contract. He might have believed he was holding the wheel firm and steady. But his version of that contract had become unbalanced. That made it unstable. It was in danger of being convulsively rejected. Such a rejection would throw off his grip on the wheel, causing it to swing free and wild. Nor was Clara ready to take hold of the wheel when it swung free. She may have a had a competing vision. But hers was vague and incomplete. She wasn’t committed enough to life, let alone leadership, to effectively take hold.
Predictable Results
The danger of such a conflict is the vacuum of power. When leadership fails, the results are predictable. The masses are unsettled by the uneasy feeling that no-one is championing their interests. The core truth—that no one is truly in charge—doesn’t escape them.
Their standard response is, unfortunately, a romance with naked authoritarianism. They are easily convinced by a demagogue to embrace policies both xenophobic and cruel. Suddenly, the suggestion that all their problems can be solved by hurting not-quite-native children starts to exhibit a disturbing appeal.
I need hardly explain the relevance to our own predicament.
What can one do not to replay this tragedy? We do have one big advantage over our forebears: this has happened before. We can learn from their mistakes. We might also hope to learn how they finally overcame their challenges.
Possibility of Optimism
Even though this is a terrifying story, I might point out that it contains within it the possibility of optimism as well. It is true the immediate consequences of Haber’s invention turned out worse than anyone feared. But we shouldn't forget: the long-term consequences were better than anybody’s wildest dreams. Both parts of this surprise were real. The negative surprise came first. The positive one took multiple generations to be fully realized. But for all that, in the long run Haber’s invention did more for humanity than he or any of his compatriots would possibly have dared to hope.
Of course, this may be the kind of “long run” by which we are all dead.
However, such patterns of history are not destiny. Maybe some technology is so disruptive that, left to its own devices, it will force decades of uncertainty and strife before it brings about a much better era. But does that mean we are doomed to suffer blindly and helplessly?
Doesn’t it mean something that we have experience with technology and the change it brings? Doesn’t it mean something that we have veritable armies of intellectuals who think about change? Doesn’t it mean something we have experienced politicians who interpret it? Doesn’t progress mean more than just having a few improvements in our mechanical servants? Doesn’t it mean we have also learned something about handling our dependence on them? Doesn’t it mean we have gotten better at managing change?
Of course, our armies of experts might, in the short run, be as much a liability as a help. When there are too many experts, any individual one becomes so specialized that they can’t rise to the challenge of integrating information from different fields. Not only that, professionals might decline the challenge of creativity, instead defending their perfectly polished orthodoxy. Perhaps a professional life spent in pursuit of polish can’t abide the bushwhacking mess made by anything path-breaking.
Catalyst for a Response
For my part, I want to believe expertise can make a real difference. I want to believe our polished professionals can also cut new paths. I want to believe we have leaders capable of filling a void. I want to believe we possess the political talent to muscle aside a demagogue. I want to believe our industrial leaders have learned something fundamental about shepherding wealth. I want to believe the elite is the elite not just because they make more money than everyone else!
Maybe the expertise of the elites simply needs a catalyst, like those Haber found to bring his magical reaction into the realm of attainable temperatures and pressures. I imagine an engineer with Clara’s inclinations could act as such a catalyst. But a better Clara: one more confident, more prescient, more outspoken, more aggressive.
This book will construct such a Clara, who survives and, informed by memory, speaks a truth to save the life of herself and her family.
The purpose of so doing is to kick our society's formidable apparatus for self-understanding and self-correction into action. We are not economists—we only can put in front of economists the right questions. We are not lawyers—we only can put in front of lawyers the right goals. We are not businesspeople—we can only put in front of business people a path to wealth. We are not politician—we can only put in front of politicians a message of hope and freedom to beat the nihilism and tyranny that assails us.
This book is not the response. No one person can respond to our crisis alone. This book is the catalyst for the response. I don't know, in detail, what the economics of a mature digital society are. But we assure the economists that the answers will matter. When but now can you do the research that will shape a new social order? I don't know, in detail, what the laws of a mature digital society are; but let me assure that new laws are needed and will be accepted. When but now can you build the buttresses of a new social order? I don't know, in detail, what the deals that business will make with government in a mature digital society; but let me assure the businessmen in the audience that no matter the regulation there will be plenty of money to be made. When but now can you position yourself for success in a new social order? I don't know, in detail, what the politics of a mature digital society are; but let me assure the politicians that it will be a politics of hope and prosperity. When but now can you lead your country to a better future?
